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DAVID B. WILLIS, JOEL R. HAMILTON,
M. HENRY ROBISON, NORMAN K. WHITTLESEY,
AND JOHN B. DRAPER'

Secondary Damages in Interstate
Water Compact Litigation
ABSTRACT
Secondary economic damages have not generally been considered
compensable in damage litigation. The reluctance to award
secondary damagesfalls in part on the economics profession, since
economists have found it difficult to measure these damages, and
even to agree on their meaning. This paper addresses both the
meaning and measurement of secondary damages in the context of
a recent U.S. Supreme Court case where one state successfully
sought secondary damages resultingfrom failure to deliver water
under an interstate water compact. This paper describes the case
and considerswhether this decision should be treated as a precedent
for other damage cases.
INTRODUCTION
Economists and the legal world have long recognized that shifts in
resource allocation and use can cause measurable direct damages to
affected individuals, organizations, or government entities. Measuring such
direct damages as the basis for compensation or restitution is a relatively
straightforward process following standard "with vs. without" estimation
procedures. Direct damage is calculated as the reduction in net economic
returns, or profit, accruing to a specific industry or sector of the economy
resulting from a reduction in resources allocated to that industry or sector.
If we assume that irrigation water supplies are scarce within a
region, net returns to irrigated agriculture within the region will decrease
when the water supply level is reduced, because irrigated production will
be less with the smaller water supply. Such a situation will arise when an
upstream region fails to release a contractually agreed upon volume of
water to a downstream region for agricultural use. In this situation, the

* Respectively, Associate Professor of Applied Economics and Statistics at Clemson
University; Emeritus Professor of Agricultural Economics and Statistics at the University of
Idaho; Senior Economist at Economic Modeling Specialists Inc. in Moscow, Idaho; Emeritus
Professor of Agricultural Economics, School of Economic Sciences at Washington State
University; and Attorney and Shareholder in Montgomery & Andrews, Santa Fe, New
Mexico.
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direct economic damage to irrigated agriculture within the downstream
region is measured as the lost profits the additional water would have
generated in agricultural production if the agreed upon volume of water
had been released by the upstream region. When one or more economic
sectors in a region are directly affected by an economic event, it is common
for other sectors in the region to experience indirect spin-off effects through
the web of purchase and sales transactions in the local economy. In this
example, the spin-off or secondary, regional impact that will ripple through
the local economy is a function of the direct economic damage level. With
a decrease in water supplies, irrigated agriculture purchases fewer inputs
(including labor) within the region, which decreases industry profits in
other industries, as well as household income. Economists and policymakers recognize these secondary (or indirect) economic impacts, and
estimates of these are commonly used to influence public policy and affect
spending on public projects. However, contrary to the routine use of direct
economic effects as measures of economic damage, secondary economic
impacts have rarely been recognized in court cases seeking recovery of
damages.
While economists widely accept the concept of secondary economic
impacts, they are difficult to measure with accuracy.' Moreover, policymakers and politicians have frequently misused secondary economic impact
measures by leaving the impression that their total magnitude is an accurate
estimate of secondary damages and a theoretically valid estimate of
secondary regional damages.2 This difficulty and confusion has led some

1. See Joel R. Hamilton & Richard L. Gardner, Value Added and Secondary Benefits in
Regional ProjectEvaluation:IrrigationDevelopment in the Snake River Basin, ANNALS REG'L SC.,
Mar. 1986, at 1, 1-11.
2. The correct secondary damage measure for an economic policy or event that causes
a reduction in regional welfare is a function of the direct damage estimate after the direct
damages have been adjusted downward to account for the fraction of idled capital and labor
that is eventually re-employed within the region over time, often at a lower economic return.
Not all idled factors of production in the directly damaged industry are permanently idled.
Accordingly, the returns these re-employed factors generate in other industries within the
region offset some of anticipated secondary economic losses. The difference between the
return the idled factors of production (primarily labor and capital) generated in their prior
use, less the return the re-employed factors earn within the region, is the appropriate value
to use in the secondary damage calculation. The sum of the lost factor return for those factors
that are permanently idled (no longer used within the region) plus the decrease in the
economic return accruing to those factors that find re-employment within the region is the
theoretically appropriate measure to use to estimate secondary damages. It is these permanent
net economic losses and how they ripple through the regional economy that ultimately
determine regional secondary damages through changes in aggregate regional purchasing
patterns.
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critics of secondary damages to dismiss them entirely (thus incorrectly
measure secondary damages at zero), while enthusiasts equate secondary
impacts with secondary damages and thus overstate damages. Either way,
decisions are made with incorrect information. The authors of this paper
believe that, with careful estimation and adjustment, secondary economic
impacts in a state or regional economy can be accurately evaluated and
properly translated into a measure of regional welfare damage that can be
used as a component of comprehensive economic damage quantification.
The U.S. Supreme Court awarded secondary damages to Kansas
based on Colorado's historic failure to deliver the amounts of water due to
Kansas under the Arkansas River Compact? This paper describes the case,
and considers whether this decision can become a precedent for other
damage litigation. The following discussion will focus on secondary
economic impacts as measures of "damage" to the Kansas state economy
resulting from Compact violations by Colorado. However, the concepts and
processes followed could also be focused on the "benefits" accrued by
Colorado through the period of Compact violations.4
This paper has two major purposes. First, it describes an important
court case in which secondary impacts were accepted as a way to measure
secondary damage to a plaintiff. Second, it provides guidance for an
appropriate methodology to measure such secondary damages. While this
paper concludes that there is only a narrow range of cases for which

3. See Arthur L. Littleworth, Special Master Third Report at 65-71, 120, Kansas v.
Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001), availableatwww.supremecourtus.gov/SpecMastRpt/ORG105-82000.pdf [hereinafter Third Report]; see Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (no exception
filed by Colorado to the Special Master's recommendation on secondary damages); see Kansas
v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 91-92 (2004) (confirming adoption by the Court of the Special
Master's recommendation on secondary damages, among others, in the Third Report). The
U.S. Supreme Court hears cases between states in its original jurisdiction, pursuant to Article
III, Section 2, Clauses 1 & 2. Since enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, this jurisdiction has
been exclusive. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000);
see also Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 (1992). The Court often assigns such cases to
be heard by Special Masters, who then file a report with the Court. The Special Master's report
contains recommendations, which become final only if adopted by the Court. The States may
fie exceptions to the Special Master's recommendations. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S.
1, 5-6 (2001). The Supreme Court first affirmed its ability to award damages for breach of an
interstate water compact in Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
4. Kansas argued that Colorado's benefits from overusing the water of the Arkansas
River could be used as a measure of the damages to be paid to Kansas as a result of
Colorado's violation of the interstate compact. The Special Master ruled that the damages
paid to Kansas should be based on losses to Kansas, not benefits to Colorado. Third Report,
supra note 3, at 119 (Kansas filed no exception).
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secondary damages might be relevant, that narrow range could include at
least other interstate water compact cases and perhaps other cases as well.
I. THE CONCEPTS OF SECONDARY IMPACTS
AND SECONDARY DAMAGES
Direct economic damages are the consequences to the directly affected
individuals, businesses, and other entities from some action or event.' The
measure of these direct economic damages is the net income lost because of
the action or event. The estimation of direct damages is a relatively
straightforward application of economic and accounting principles.
Secondary economic impacts result as the direct economic effects
ripple through the rest of the regional economy.6 These secondary impacts
occur when the directly affected sector(s) would ordinarily buy inputs from
other regional businesses (backward linkages) or produce outputs that
serve as raw materials for other regional industries (forward linkages). A
new irrigation project will cause agriculture to buy more from backwardlinked fertilizer, machinery, and insurance sectors, and may allow
expansion of forward-linked livestock and food-processing sectors.
Damages to an existing irrigation sector would have opposite effects business losses in both forward- and backward-linked sectors. The measure
of these secondary impacts is often conceptualized as lost "value added":
the lost wages, rents, and profits that would have accrued to the labor, land,
and capital elsewhere in the regional economy, if not for the primary shock.
Available estimation tools, including most notably, input-output (I0) models,7 allow estimation of the backward-linked secondary impacts of
a project or event on regional economic activity and on regional value
added. While forward-linked impacts are theoretically real and measurable,
damage estimation for Kansasv. Colorado, as in most other studies, focused
only on the assessment of backward-linked economic effects. Forwardlinked impacts are usually ignored in impact analysis because they are

5. Cf. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages§ 38 (2003) (defining "general damages" as the "direct,
natural, logical, and necessary consequences of the injury").
6. See Joel R. Hamilton et al., Economic Impacts, Value Added, and Benefits in Regional
ProjectAnalysis, 73 AM. J. AGRIc. EcoN. 334,334-44 (1991) [hereinafter Hamilton I]; see also Joel
R. Hamilton et al., InterregionalSpillovers in RegionalImpact Assessment: New Mexico, Texas, and
the Supreme Court, 25 GROWTH & CHANGE 75,75-89 (1994) [hereinafter Hamilton II].
7.

See generally RONALD E. MILLER & PETER D. BLAIR, INPuT-OuTPuT ANALYSIS:

FOUNDATIONS AND EXTENSIONS (1985).
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much more speculative and difficult to model and quantify. With the tools
now available, estimation of the backward-linked secondary economic
impacts to an affected economic region is relatively straightforward.
It is more difficult, but very important, to distinguish between the
initial secondary economic impact of an induced economic change and the
actual change in economic welfare, the net secondary effect. Two respected
commentaries have noted that secondary impacts expressed as a function
of the change in value added are not valid measures of direct damages or
benefits, primarily because a portion of the direct value-added economic
impacts are, in part, transitory. 9 Mobile capital and labor (significant value
added components) will be re-employed over time in next-best alternatives.
It is only the long-term net economic welfare effect that is an appropriate
measure of the damage or benefit from an economic event. While the
precipitating event may indeed directly affect many sectors, rippling along
the web of purchase and sales transactions to impact other businesses in the
regional economy, these secondary impacts are not permanent, to the extent
that the regional economy adjusts over time. In time, displaced labor will
find alternative employment inside or outside the region. Similarly, capital
will either move to other uses, or be depreciated. Even land, although
immobile, nearly always has some alternative uses.
Economists call the value of a resource in its next-best alternative
use its "opportunity cost." ° Theoretically, the opportunity cost could range
from near zero to 100 percent of the total secondary economic effect. It will
depend upon the local economic conditions, which resources are affected
and their mobility, and the permanent or temporary nature of the economic
change being considered. In simple terms, the way to compute secondary
damages, or the net effect, is to subtract opportunity costs from the total
secondary impacts after the displaced resources have been reemployed."

8.

See JOHN E. KEITH & TERRENCE F. GLOVER, SECONDARY IMPACTS AND BENEFITS OF

WATER REALLOCATION IN THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN OF IDAHO (1988) (report to the Snake River

Studies Advisory Committee, Idaho Water Resources Research Institute); see Jan Oosterhaven,

On the Plausibilityof the Supply-Driven Input-OutputModel, 28 J.REG'L. So. 203,203-17 (1988);
see also Jan Oosterhaven, The Supply-Driven Input-OutputModel: A New Interpretationbut Still
Implausible, 29 J. REG'L. SQ. 459, 459-65 (1989); Hamilton I, supranote 6.
9. See Robert A. Young & S. Lee Gray, Input-Output Models, Economic Surplus, and the
Evaluation of State or Regional Water Plans, 21 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1819, 1819-23 (1985); see

Charles W. Howe, Project Benefits and Costs from National and Regional Viewpoints:
Methodological Issues and Case Study of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, 27 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 5, 5-20 (1987).
10. See EDWARD J. MISHAN, Cosr-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 65 (1976).
11. See Hamilton I, supranote 6, at 334-44.
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However the process of measurement of the net economic effects can be
fraught with difficulty and controversy.
II. DAMAGES IN KANSAS V. COLORADO
Kansas and Colorado have contested the interstate allocation of
Arkansas River water for more than a century. The Arkansas River rises in
central Colorado and flows through Kansas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas.
Irrigation started in southeastern Colorado and southwestern Kansas in the
1800s, diverting water from the Arkansas River and more recently from
linked aquifers. 2 Litigation filed by Kansas in 1901 alleged that Colorado
was using unfair amounts of water. 3 More litigation ensued. 4 Eventually,
the Arkansas River Compact was negotiated and approved by the States of
Colorado and Kansas in 1948 and by Congress in 1949.' The adoption of the
Compact was only a prelude to more litigation over compact noncompliance. 6 In the current case (filed by Kansas in 1985), the U.S. Supreme
Court confirmed the finding of the Special Master that "[post-Compact]
pumping in Colorado ha[d] caused material depletions of the usable
Stateline flows of the Arkansas River, in violation of the Arkansas River
Compact." 7 The Court remanded the case to the Special Master to
determine the amount of the Compact violation in acre-feet and the remedy
18
for that violation.
A. Direct Damages
Secondary, or indirect, economic effects are always caused by the
direct effects stimulated by the phenomenon being considered. On remand,
Kansas's experts presented direct economic damage estimates based on

12. See Arthur L. Littleworth, Special Master Report Volume 1, 1-10, 35-40, Kansas v.
Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995); seeKansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673,675-678 (1995) (first report
of the Special Master).
13. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
14. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
15. Arkansas River Compact, COLO.REV. STAT. § 37-69-101 (1973); KAN. SrAT. ANN. § 82a520; Act of Congress of May 31,1949, 63 Stat. 145.
16. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, "[A] compact is after all a legal document. Though
the circumstances of its drafting are likely to assure great care and deliberation, all avoidance
of disputes as to scope and meaning is not within human gift." West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v.
Sims, 341 U.S. 23,28 (1951).
17. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673,694 (1995).
18. Id.
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three separate categories of income losses resulting from depletions of
usable stateline flows.19 These were:
1. GroundwaterPumping to Replace Depleted Surface Water Deliveries
Many Kansas farmers in the Arkansas River canal service areas had
developed wells to supplement surface water supplies from the river. Some
of the initial wells were shallow, pumping from the alluvial aquifer
recharged directly by seepage from the river. But the shallow aquifer was
soon dewatered, so that essentially all the pumping of groundwater was
through deeper wells developed to pump from the Ogallala aquifer. An
underlying assumption of the analysis was that farmers who had wells with
access to groundwater for irrigation could and would utilize those wells to
supplement surface water supplies when necessary. It was also assumed,
for farms with wells, that groundwater pumping fully satisfied all crop
demands not met by surface water. Hence, any depletion of these farmers'
available surface water supplies below their full crop water requirements
was assumed to have resulted in additional groundwater pumping. The
states stipulated that, as a result of the 420,071 acre-feet of shortfall at the
stateline during the period 1950-94,154,526 acre-feet of water was pumped
to make up losses on farms with wells and that the deliveries to farms
without wells fell short by 72,036 acre-feet. 20
Well-pumping costs were composed of capital investment expenses
as well as the variable costs of well operation. The general procedure for
allocating the investment costs of wells, pumps, and motors was to establish
their capital investment cost and the appropriate depreciable life of each
item. Annual interest and capital depreciation costs were allocated to a perunit value based on the average annual hours of use. The fixed costs of
ownership were then combined with the variable cost components of well
operation. The variable cost items consisted of repairs, fuel (electricity or
natural gas), lubricants, maintenance, and labor. Federal income taxes that
would have been paid on the lost income were estimated and deducted
from the direct damages.21

19. See NORMAN K. WHITrLESEY EF AL., EVALUATION OF KANSAS'S CLAIM FOR MONEY
DAMAGES FOR IS LoSSES FROM COLORADO'S VIOLATIONS OF THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMFACr,

1950-94 (1998) (expert report presented by Kansas as Kan. Exhs. 892 & 1001, in Kansas v.
Colorado,533 U.S. 1 (2001)).
20. Third Report, supra note 3, at 9.
21. See id. at 17-36.
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2. Increased Regional Pumping Costs Due to Aquifer Drawdown
A result of the depletions in the Arkansas River due to Colorado
violations of the Arkansas River Compact was to place a heavier burden on
the groundwater supplies in Kansas because of the increased pumping
described above. The surface water depletions also diminished the aquifer
recharge from surface water flows, including from the Arkansas River itself,
canal losses, reservoir seepage, and on-farm losses.22 The regional loss of
groundwater totaled 324,866 acre-feet. These effects on the aquifer resulted
in a permanent additional reduction in the static water level for the major
water supply that drives the local economy in southwestern Kansas. All
affected users of the aquifer have been required to pump water from greater
depths since 1950 due to the unwarranted use of water in Colorado. This
increased pumping depth has resulted in higher costs of water acquisition,
a direct income effect on Kansas water users. This drawdown effect is
essentially permanent and the increased costs of pumping will continue
indefinitely.
It was determined that the increased pumping depth imposed on
all water users in the impacted region affected the variable costs of
pumping, mainly energy and maintenance, but did not affect the fixed costs
of well ownership. These were the direct costs that drove the secondary
economic impacts resulting from the aquifer drawdown. Historic
drawdown effects were considered by the court for the period 1950-94, and
future drawdown effects were considered for the next 50 years.'
3. Crop Production Losses
Surface water depletions affected two types of surface water users
in the ditch service areas. The first was that group of farmers who had wells
that could be used to replace the surface water depletions, and whose costs
were described above in the first category of direct effects. It was stipulated
that those farmers were able to replace all on-farm water depletions at the
average total cost of pumping and therefore did not incur a crop production
loss. The second type was that group of farmers who did not have wells to
replace the diminished surface water deliveries. Their water supplies were
much less certain, so they chose crops that could be grown with variable
water supplies or "crops that could wait for water." Their entire irrigable
acreage was cropped each year with a combination of alfalfa, wheat, and

22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 37-38.
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sorghum, each capable of providing some usable yield regardless of the
surface water supply. It was determined that there was always sufficient
water to establish the crops and to provide some yield but never sufficient
water to provide a maximum attainable yield. Hence, the marginal
increments of water depletion (measured in terms of crop consumptive use)
always affected crop yield in a linear fashion between the extremes of crop
establishment and maximum yield. Annual changes in crop yield and value,
minus the marginal costs of irrigation and harvest, became the measure of
direct damage to these farmers. 24 In addition, there were direct effects on
farm-program payments over time caused by the diminished crop yields.
Kansas's direct damages were estimated as the sum of the income
losses associated with crop production losses and the increased groundwater pumping costs. Kansas used standard economic and accounting
procedures to estimate the present value (with interest) of direct damages.
Kansas's estimate of the direct damages, including interest, as presented at
trial, was about $60 million in 1998 dollars.2 5 The direct damage estimate
was subsequently adjusted to derive the secondary economic damage
estimate.
B. Secondary Damages
To estimate the secondary economic damages to the rest of the
Kansas regional economy, Kansas used 1-0 methodology, as implemented
in the IMPLAN (impact analysis for planning) database and software
package. 2 This allowed construction of a model of the Kansas regional
economy, which was used to trace the $60 million in direct damages
through the web of regional purchases and sales to estimate the backwardlinked secondary impacts to the Kansas economy. These included the effects
of reduced spending for production inputs and consumption items because
farmers and laborers had less income and profits to spend. This approach
also recognized that Kansas farmers increased spending on wells, pumps,
and the power to run them. While caused by water shortage and

24. Id. at 47-48.
25. Ultimately the award of prejudgment interest to Kansas was reduced by the Supreme
Court from the amount presented by Kansas at trial, based on the Court's balancing of the
equities and its view that some, but not all, prejudgment interest should be allowed. See
Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1,9-16 (2001). The final amount paid to Kansas by Colorado was
about $35 million. This included stipulated compensation for 1995-96 violations and
prejudgment interest, including adjustments for inflation, pursuant to the determinations of
the Court. The payment also included secondary damages determined as described below.
26. Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc., 1999.
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groundwater decline, the additional well costs actually stimulated the local
economy, and partially offset some of the negative secondary impacts.
Kansas's experts estimated that the 1998 present value of these net
secondary impacts totaled $18.5 million.
Kansas recognized that the $18.5 million estimate of backwardlinked secondary impacts would be an overestimate of secondary damages
because much of the lost wages, rents, and profits were from labor, capital,
and land that were most likely reemployed elsewhere in the economy
following their displacement.
Kansas adopted a procedure proposed earlier by Howe,27 and used
by Howe as an expert witness in a similar interstate water compact
enforcement case, Texas v. New Mexico, on the Pecos River.2 In that case,
Howe stated his opinion that 80 percent of the secondary impacts would be
offset by the opportunity costs of the displaced resources reemployed in
their next-best alternative.29 This would leave 20 percent of the impacts as
net damages. Howe based the 80-percent opportunity cost figure on his
own earlier work, which in turn cited the work of Robert H. Haveman and
John V. Krutilla. 30 Using the 80-percent opportunity cost figure, Kansas
experts reduced their [$18.5 million] estimate of secondary impacts down
to a $3.7 million secondary damages claim.
Colorado moved to exclude all evidence by the Kansas experts on
the secondary damages issue, claiming that the testimony and exhibits of
Kansas experts did not meet the tests for expert testimony (the "junk science
rules") set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 31 and Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.32 Daubert and Kumho had set standards for the
admissibility of scientific and technical expert testimony based on a flexible
list of reliability factors.33 Specifically, Colorado argued that Kansas's use

27. Howe, supra note 9.
28. Economic Damages to Texas from Braches of the Pecos River Compact: 1950 to 1986,
Kansas Exhibit 950, Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (Original No. 65) (this expert report
was submitted in Texas v. New Mexico, 494 U.S. 111 (1990)) [hereinafter Howe 1989]. The Texas
damages claim was ultimately settled, resulting in a Stipulated Judgment in the amount of
$14 million. Texas v. New Mexico, 494 U.S. 111 (1990).
29. Howe 1989, supra note 28, at 15-19.
30. Id.; ROBERT H. HAVEMAN & JOHN V. KRUTILLA WITH ROBERT M. STEINBERG,
UNEMPLOYMENT, IDLE CAPACITY, AND THE EVALUATION OF PuBuc ExPENDITURES: NATIONAL
AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS (1968).

31. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
32. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
33. 1 GEORGE E. DiX ETAL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 832 n.46 (Kenneth S. Broun
ed., West Publishing Co., 6th ed. 2006).
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of IMPLAN was not "sufficiently reliable to calculate secondary economic
impacts going backwards for a period of 45 years, and forward for 50
years."' Colorado also asserted that Kansas's use of an 80-percent figure for
opportunity cost had insufficient empirical foundation.
Colorado's objection to the secondary damage evidence was
overruled by the Special Master. 35 Testimony by Kansas's experts noted that
Professor Wassily Leontief developed I-0 methodology in the 1930s and
1940s, a contribution for which he later was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Economics (1973). Hence there was no question of the professional
acceptance of the basic theoretical framework. The development of
computing power in recent decades has made 1-0 methodology accessible
and reliable enough to allow its widespread use. The IMPLAN database
and software package is a state-of-the-art package for conducting 1-0
analysis, and Kansas's experts documented a wide range of cases where this
methodology was used to estimate secondary impacts in the context of
project impact analyses, regional studies, and policy analyses. 36 While
Kansas's experts acknowledged that the 80-percent opportunity cost figure
would benefit from additional empirical verification, they pointed to several
other studies where opportunity costs of 80 percent or less were
used - meaning that 20 percent or more of secondary impacts were
considered net benefits. In the end, the Special Master overruled Colorado's
Daubertobjection, noting, "There can be little doubt that evidence resulting
from an input-output model analysis, and from IMPLAN in particular, meet
the admissibility standards of Daubert and Kumho."37
More important, the Special Master accepted the concept that
secondary damages are compensable:
I find that the weight of evidence supports the Kansas claim
for secondary economic damages. They may have to be
recalculated, depending upon any revisions to the underlying
[direct] damages, but the methodology used by the Kansas

34. Third Report, supranote 3, app. at 82 (Order Overruling Colorado's Objection to the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Secondary Economic Damages).
35. Id. at 84.
36. Philip Wandschneider et al., Analytic andMeasurementIssues in Regulatory Benefits-Cost
Analysis: A Case Study of Regulations to Reduce Grass Seed Field Burning in EasternWashington
Burning, NORTHWESrJ. Bus. & ECON. (1998); see NORMAN K. WHIrLESEY, HENRY ROIsON &
JOELHAMILTON, EcONOMIc EFFECTS OF IRRIGATED LAND RETIREMENT IN THE PECOSRIVER BASIN

(1993) (prepared for the New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission); Hamilton II,supranote
6.
37. Third Report, supra note 3, app. at 82 (Order Overruling Colorado's Objection to the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Secondary Economic Damages).
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experts should be employed in making any such final damage
estimates. 38
The trial in front of the Special Master on the remedy for past
compact violations was completed in January 2000. In 2001 the Supreme
Court issued its opinion approving a damage quantification that accepted
the Special Master's recommendation that secondary damages should be
included.39 Thus secondary damages were judged to be compensable in this
case, and the methodology of 1-0 analysis, as implemented by IMPLAN,
was held to be an acceptable way to estimate these damages.
During and following trial, the methodology for estimating direct
damages and the procedures for computing interest on damages continued
to evolve. Ultimately, Colorado paid a total of $34.6 million damages to
Kansas, a sum that included about $2 million in secondary damages.
III. PRECEDENT OR SPECIAL CASE?
There is little precedent in past litigation for claims of secondary
damages, or for the use of 1-0 methodology such as IMPLAN for damage
estimation in such cases. We have found only two other cases that might be
construed as precedents.
Secondary damages played a part in the similar Texas v. New Mexico
litigation over the Pecos River Compact. Both Whittlesey and Hamilton,
authors of this paper, were experts for New Mexico, the defendant in that
case.' The issue was initially raised in the Pecos River case by Texas, the
plaintiff in that case, to measure the secondary benefits that New Mexico
had captured while using water that should have been delivered to Texas.41
New Mexico used similar procedures to estimate the secondary damages
to Texas.42 Thus both sides in that case accepted the idea of secondary
benefits and damages, both sides accepted the use of 1-0 methodology to
estimate these impacts, and both sides accepted the 80-percent opportunity

38. Id. at 71.
39. See Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001). Although Colorado vigorously opposed
secondary damages during trial before the Special Master, Colorado did not file an exception
challenging the award of secondary damages. The Court later confirmed that it had adopted
the Special Master's Third Report in all respects not specifically modified by the Court.
Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86,91-92 (2004).
40. The authors of this paper were either experts or counsel for Kansas, the plaintiff in
Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86,91-92 (2004).
41. Howe 1989, supra note 28, at 15-19.
42. See Hamilton, supra note 1.
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cost rule for converting impacts to net costs or benefits. The Texas v. New
Mexico case was settled for $14 million during damage valuation hearings
in front of a Special Master.' Because there was a settlement in that case,
rather than a ruling after trial, Texas v. New Mexico does not provide a
formal precedent for other cases regarding secondary damages.
Another case that appears to have awarded some form of secondary
damages involved pollution damage to fisheries on the James River and
Chesapeake Bay. Pruitt v. Allied Chemical" was brought by a group of
fishermen and related businesses that claimed damages after Allied
Chemical released the chemical Kepone into the James River. In that case
the U.S. District Court awarded direct damages to the commercial
fishermen; it awarded indirect (secondary) damages to the boat, marina,
tackle, and bait shop owners; and it denied indirect damages to the plaintiff
seafood wholesalers, retailers, processors, distributors, and restaurants that
claimed to have lost profits because of the lost seafood supplies. Pruitt's
cause of action was in tort law, interstate compact enforcement cases, on the
other hand, sound in contract law.45
Several factors explain the scarcity of precedent for the award of
secondary economic damages in litigation:
(1)

Secondary damage claims apply most cleanly to cases where the
plaintiff or defendant in a damage case is a state, or a regional or
municipal entity.
It is generally held that secondary impacts are small or absent given
a national economic development (NED) accounting perspective. The U.S.
Water Resources Council directed that secondary impacts not be included
in NED analyses of federally funded water resources projects unless there
is massive national level unemployment of labor and capital.' The logic is
that resources employed by a new water project are generally bid away
from other productive employment elsewhere in the national economy.47
While the Water Resources Council guidelines were intended to apply
prospectively to new federally funded water projects, in practice the
guidelines are used much more broadly as guides for economic analysis,

43. See Texas v. New Mexico, 494 U.S. 111 (1990).
44. See Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 980 (E.D. Va. 1981).
45. "A Compact is, after all, a contract." Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
46. Water and Related Land Resources Planning Principles, Standards and Procedures:
Repeal of Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 10250,10254-55 (March 10, 1983) (repealing 18 C.F.R. pts.
711, 713, 714, and 716).
47. Id. at 10255, 10257.
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and provide a reasonable guide for the retrospective analysis of damage
cases. This rationale generally precludes the United States from claiming
national-level secondary damages.
The Water Resources guidelines do allow secondary impacts to be
included in the regional economic development (RED) accounting for
project analysis, although the regional opportunity cost of labor and other
inputs must still be accounted for.8 This implies that damage claims where
a participant is a state, a large municipality, or other sovereign entity (such
as an Indian tribe) are realistic possibilities. The entity would have to be of
sufficient size to encompass the web of sales and purchases that propagate
secondary damages (e.g., a "functional economic area"49), and sovereign
enough to claim the damages. Such claims are infrequent given these
prerequisites, hence the lack of precedent.
Individual claims of secondary damages would be more speculative
harder
to quantify than regional damages. An individual would
and
typically have to establish that the damage to the primary affected firm or
sector was the "proximate cause" of his secondary damages, which would
be difficult to show unless a strong contractual relationship linked the two.
A vertically integrated industry might be an example where one segment
of the industry was affected directly leaving other sectors to be affected
indirectly. Generally any individual claim would be speculative because
calculated secondary effects to a specific business firm are more uncertain,
more case-specific, and more subject to change over time than the aggregate
secondary effects on a region, which are quite stable over time.50 Such a
claim would almost have to be based on the existence of a contractual or
strong historical relationship between the primarily impacted firm and the
secondarily impacted firm, and almost certainly could not be modeled with
a methodology such as IMPLAN. However, a large vertically integrated
firm might incur internalized secondary effects from shocks to any given
level of its operations.
Pruittv. Allied Chemical apparently recognized these variations in
proximity to the initial shock. Of the plaintiffs in that case, the fishermen

Id. at 10254-55.
KARL A. Fox & KRISHNA T. KUMAR, The Functional Economic Area: Delineationand
Implicationsfor Economic Analysis and Policy, in URBAN-REGIONAL ECONOMICS, SOcIAL SYSTEM
ACCOUNTS, AND ECO-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, SELECTED WRITINGS BY KARL A. Fox, 23-51 (James
R. Prescott, Paul van Moeseke, and Jati K. Sengupta eds., 1994).
48.
49.

50. RONALD E. MILLER, STABILITY OF SUPPLY COEFFICIENTS AND CONSISTENCY OF SUPPLYDRIVEN AND DEMAND-DRIVEN INPUT-OUTPUT MODELS: A COMMENT, 21 ENv'T & PLANNING A 8,

1113-20 (1989).
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were awarded direct damages. The boat, marina, tackle, and bait-shop
owners who supplied inputs to the fishermen (that is, the backward-linked
economic sectors) were awarded indirect (secondary) damages. The seafood
wholesalers, retailers, processors, distributors, and restaurants that handled
the caught fish (the forward-linked economic sectors) received no indirect
(secondary) damage compensation. While 1-0 methods were not used in
Pruitt (the claims were based instead on historic business relationships
among specific firms), the findings in that case are consistent with the thencurrent state of analytic methodology. As noted earlier, forward linkages
are more difficult to model with confidence than backward linkages.51
It might be possible to pursue a case of damages to individuals as
a class action, but the class of affected parties could be very large, the extent
of damage to each would be difficult to establish, and the secondary
damages to many parties would be small, making such an approach
52
unlikely.
(2)

Actions brought by one state against another under the original
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court must also satisfy the
restrictions imposed by the 11th Amendment.
The 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "The
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State." This Amendment has been held to
restrict states from suing other states for claims that are really aggregations
of claims of its individual citizens.5 3However, under a legal doctrine known
as "parens patriae," states are allowed to bring suit in their capacity as legal
guardians for their citizens.' Kansas v. Colorado presented the challenging

51. See Hamilton I & II, supra, note 6; ROBERT A. YOUNG & CHARLES W. HOWE.,
HANDBOOK FOR THE ECONoMIc EVALUATION OF APPLICATION FOR APPROPRIATION OF SURFACE
AND GROUNDWATER IN THE STATE OF IDAHO, REP. TO THE SNAKE RIVER STUDIES ADVISORY
COMM., IDAHO WATER RES. RESEARCH INST. (1988).
52. Cf Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615, 623 (1997) (noting two
requirements to qualify for class certification under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3): "Common
questions must predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and class
resolution must be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy") (internal quotations omitted).
53. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) cited in Kansas v.
Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2001).

54. R.H. Abrams, Is Kansas Entitled to Money Damagesfor the Breach of the Arkansas River
Compact, 6 J. A.B.A.J. 317 (2001).
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and "rarefied" issue of how parens patriae relates to the 11th Amendment."'
The damages proven by Kansas were mainly suffered by members of her
citizenry, rather than by the state itself. Typically, damages collected in
parens patriaesuits are held by the state for the benefit of all her citizens, not
just the few who are affected.- 6 In Kansas v. Coloradothe Court held that the
11th Amendment was not a bar to recovery.-" The fact that Kansas relied on
the losses of its water users was no impediment, nor was any significance
attached to the fact that some of these water users were actually residents
and citizens of Colorado. Kansas was not recovering any damages owed to
its water users, but was recovering damages owed to itself. The losses of the
water users were merely the measure of those damages; payment would go
to the state - to use as it saw fit - not to the farmers and other affected
individuals.' The paucity of secondary damages precedent may be due in
part to the few cases that can similarly satisfy the requirements of the 11th
Amendment.
The theoretical and methodological foundations for making a claim
of secondary damages are quite recent.
The methodology of I-0 analysis, which was originally applied to
the United States as a whole, dates to the work of Wassily W. Leontief
beginning in the 1930s 9 and has only been applied to regions such as states
(initiating the discipline of regional science) since the 1950s. 60 However,
until the mid-1980s the use of regional I-0 methodology in applied studies
faced a dilemma, with accurate but prohibitively expensive survey models
(3)

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. As Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, which was unanimous on this point: "The
governing principle is that in order to invoke our original jurisdiction, the State must show
a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are
the real parties in interest. Kansas has unquestionably made such a showing. Indeed, the
present proceeding is but one of several in which Kansas' own interest in preventing
upstream diversions from the Arkansas River has justified an exercise of our original
jurisdiction." Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
58. Kansas Exhibit 891, Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) ("It is wholly consistent
with that view that the State should recover any damages that may be awarded, money it
would be free to spend in the way it determines is in the public interest.").
59. Wassily W. Leontief, QuantitativeInput and OutputRelations in the Economic System of
the United States, 18 REV. ECON. STAT. 105 (1936).
60. Frederick T. Moore & James W. Petersen, Regional Analysis:An InterindustryModel of
Utah, 37 REV. EcoN. STAT. 4, 368 (1955).
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on one hand, and non-survey models of dubious accuracy on the other.61 It
has only been in the last decade, with advances in both computing power
and non-survey 1-0 techniques, that readily available and generally
accepted 1-0 modeling methods have been available for routine regional
impact analysis.
While IMPLAN-generated models were used to estimate secondary
damages in Kansasv. Colorado,it is not the only choice, or necessarily always
the best choice, for this kind of analysis. Other regional 1-0 modeling
systems more or less comparable to IMPLAN might be used,62 or so might,
for that matter, modeling frameworks that are not strictly regional 1-0
models per se, perhaps including the growing array of "computable general
equilibrium" models.'
The setting for the present paper is the calculation of damages in a
dispute over interstate water use. However, the principles might just as
easily apply to any exercise in applied benefit/cost analysis, such as
alternative transportation projects, natural resource policies, or any other
public (or private) issue where significant secondary effects are likely.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have described the lawsuit of Kansas v. Colorado, in which
Kansas claimed and was awarded both direct and secondary damages
caused by Colorado's under-delivery of Arkansas River water. There are
few precedents where secondary damages have been awarded because such
suits generally have to be filed by states or municipalities, must surmount
the 11th Amendment, and must be able to quantify the impact in a way that
only recent advances in economic modeling methods make possible. Now
that estimates of secondary damages can be generated that meet the tests
of methodological rigor and acceptable accuracy, we assert that secondary
economic damages should be accepted, in appropriate cases, on a level with
direct economic damages.

61. Rodney C. Jensen, Constructionand Use of Regional Input-Output Models: Progressand
Prospects,13 INT'L REG'L SCL REV. 1, 9 (1990).
62. Two currently available regional I-O alternatives to IMPLAN are Economic Modeling
Specialists, Inc.'s El (economic impact) Model, http://www.economicmodeling.com/ and the
Rutgers University, Center for Urban Policy Research R/Econ Model, http://www.policy.
rutgers.edu/cupr/recon/.

63. See PETER BERCK Er AL., The Use of Computable General Equilibrium Models to Assess
Water Policies, in THE EcoNoMIcs AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE IN
AGRICULTURE 212 (Ariel Dinar & David Zilberman, eds., 1991).
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Lawyers and economists should seriously consider the implications
of secondary damages in future litigation as states continue to sue each
other over water rights issues. The concept of secondary damages may also
apply more generally in some other natural resource damage cases, and
perhaps even more widely. Meanwhile, it is important that economists
continue to refine the theory and methods required to properly estimate
these secondary damages.

